Unthinking the Unthinkable: U.S. Nuclear Policy and Asymmetric Threats; Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 2 February 2004) by Huntley, Wade L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2004-02-04
Unthinking the Unthinkable: U.S.
Nuclear Policy and Asymmetric Threats;
Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 2 February 2004)
Huntley, Wade L.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 3, issue 2 (February 2004)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11213
Unthinking the Unthinkable: U.S. Nuclear Policy and Asymmetric 
Threats 
Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 2 (February 2004) 
by Wade L. Huntley 
Strategic Insights is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
For a PDF version of this article, click here.  
Introduction 
Barry Zellen's recent essay, "Rethinking the Unthinkable: Nuclear Weapons and the War on Terror," 
offers an unabashed endorsement of the Bush administration's strategy of preemptive or preventive war 
and its willingness to consider first use of nuclear weapons for counterproliferation and 
counterterrorism.[1] Zellen supports the administration's policy to undertake preemptive and preventive 
military action to counter terrorist threats, the war on Iraq as an application of this policy, and preparations 
for threatening and implementing first-use of nuclear weapons in future preemptive contexts. 
By coincidence, on the same day I read Zellen's piece, I encountered another offering sharply different 
views. The starting point, this latter author wrote, is "that which everyone agrees to: that nuclear war is so 
terrible that it must not be allowed to happen." The purpose of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons has been 
and should continue to be "only retaliatory." Threats to use tactical nuclear weapons, first or otherwise, 
are justified only to gird "the effectiveness of deterrence." Even granting the adversary "but a thread of 
rationality," deterrence "has worked and is working today." Underlying this restrictive view of the function 
of U.S. nuclear weapons is the conviction, "Force of arms is not the way to resolve international disputes." 
"[W]e must remember that as health is not just the absence of sickness, neither is peace just the absence 
of war." "We reject war as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy because it is repugnant to our national 
morality." One might think this prioritization of the moral imperative to avoid war reflects a wooly idealism 
with no place in U.S. security policy. One might be surprised, then, to learn the proponent of these views: 
then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.[2]  
Weinberger's essay defended Reagan administration nuclear policy initiatives that at the time were 
considered by some to be accelerating the superpower arms race and increasing the danger of nuclear 
war. Weinberger defended developing tactical nuclear capabilities for "escalation dominance" and the 
threatening of "first use" of nuclear weapons. But his essay also makes clear that "escalation dominance" 
was strictly for deterrence purposes, and "first use" threats were necessary to deter overwhelming Soviet 
conventional superiority in Europe.  
By contrast, the Bush administration's embrace of a wide range of tactical capabilities and first use 
options reaching well beyond deterrence marks the dramatic departure of its strategic and nuclear 
policies not only from the general thrust of past U.S. postures but also from the administration's own 
conservative progenitors. Because these nuclear policy initiatives may shape the U.S. posture for 
generations to come—perhaps long after the "war on terrorism" has faded as a national priority—it is 
incumbent upon us to fully think through such an embrace of the unthinkable. 
The following essay first reviews the self-described dramatic changes in U.S. nuclear policy laid out in the 
2001 Nuclear Posture Review. The essay then assesses the administration's argument as to the need to 
prepare for first use of nuclear weapons for purposes of counterproliferation and counterterrorism. The 
essay concludes with some observations on how the evolution of U.S. nuclear weapons strategies fits 
into longer-term trends in U.S. security attitudes.  
The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
The Bush Administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) bills itself as providing a major change in 
U.S. strategic policy to fit the new demands of the post Cold War and post-9/11 world.[3] The core 
innovation in the NPR is a new "triad" combining offensive, defensive, and infrastructure capabilities. 
Among the other virtues the NPR ascribes to this new strategic triad is reduction in U.S. dependence on 
nuclear weapons.  
However, the NPR does not call for a reduced reliance on deterrence per se. Rather, the new triad 
envisions supplementing deterrence with "new concepts" (such as counterproliferation), "active defenses" 
(principally meaning missile defense), and "responsive infrastructure" (principally meaning a reconstituted 
nuclear weapons production capability).  
Following from this strategy, the administration is moving to resuscitate fissile material production facilities, 
and the Defense Department's Nuclear Weapons Council has begun debating whether the United States 
needs to resume nuclear testing in order to carry out these development plans. The NPR does plan 
reductions in the number of operational nuclear weapons and adjusts their alert level, but also envisions 
greatly diversifying the types of nuclear weapons in the arsenal, including production of new low-yield, 
earth-penetrating, and damage-limiting nuclear weapons suitable for tactical, first strike missions.[4]  
Planning acquisition of new tactical capabilities is not the NPR's most fundamental broadening of the role 
of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and alliance relations. The NPR also calls for replacing the 
U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) with an "adaptive planning" approach explicitly blending 
conventional and nuclear capabilities as interchangeable options, selection between which would be 
determined solely on the basis of the contingency at hand. This unprecedented vision for broadening 
tactical nuclear weapons use options is complemented with a call for increasing non-nuclear "strategic 
strike" capability to create a seamless integration of capabilities that erase the view of nuclear weapons 
use as a qualitatively distinct option with additional unique consequences. 
Despite the NPR's claims of novelty, many of its ideas are really old wine in new bottles. Most, including 
development of new tactical nuclear weapons capabilities, have been percolating in the Pentagon, the 
weapons labs and civilian think tanks for at least a decade.[5] Some, such as the centrality of missile 
defense, date to the Reagan administration. Indeed, the call for new strategies for nuclear weapons use 
in limited contingencies revivifies "war-fighting" strategies that are as old as the nuclear age itself.  
The dangers of such capabilities and strategies are well established: they tend to erode the "firebreak" 
between conventional and nuclear war long seen as a key psychological impediment to nuclear 
engagement. The countervailing argument, evinced in Weinberger's logic, is also well established: 
escalation dominance actually bolsters deterrence more than it weakens the psychological "firebreak." 
The critical point here, however, is that the Bush administration is seeking new tactical nuclear weapons 
for counterforce missions in which there is no risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear war. Hence, the 
logic offered by Weinberger as the only justification for U.S. limited nuclear use options does not apply.  
In addition, Bush administration plans to complement broadened tactical nuclear weapons use options 
with increased non-nuclear "strategic strike" capabilities would also erode the "firebreak" from the other 
side. This complete integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities in a single strategic motif, perhaps 
even more than the creation of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons, goes further than ever 
before in U.S. strategic policy toward treating nuclear weapons as simply "another arrow in the quiver."  
While the NPR is threaded with references to sustaining U.S. nuclear capabilities for deterrence, it is also 
explicit in describing melding these with conventional strategic strike capabilities, and adding defense and 
infrastructure components to form a new "triad," as necessary to prepare for deterrence failure. The intent 
is clear: to put in place the capabilities and strategies for the United States to threaten use of nuclear 
weapons for purposes other than deterrence and to expand U.S. flexibility to follow through on these 
threats and use its own nuclear weapons in non-retaliatory missions if it deems this necessary.  
Clearly, the Bush administration has abandoned the practical as well as moral dimensions of 
Weinberger's exclusive reliance on deterrence to justify the Reagan administration's nuclear position. This 
profound shift in the nation's nuclear weapons policies demands an equally profound justification of its 
own.  
Lunatics on the Loose? 
Weinberger's arguments on U.S. nuclear policies were focused on the Soviet nuclear threat, which 
evaporated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The NPR itself 
acknowledges that with the "new relationship between the U.S. and Russia," it is inappropriate to sustain 
U.S. forces even at a level "as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the threat posed by 
the former Soviet Union." Therefore, justification for expanding U.S. nuclear capabilities and strategies 
beyond their Cold War deterrence roles must be found in the new circumstances of the post-Cold War, 
and especially post-9/11, era. There is no doubt we now live in a different world; the key questions are 
exactly how this world is different, and what the appropriate responses are. To sustain the strategy laid 
out in the NPR, the argument must be not only that new dire threats to U.S. security have emerged, but 
that an adequate response to these threats requires an unprecedented offensive expansion of U.S. 
nuclear policy. 
The Bush administration's first exposition of its view of the United States' new threat matrix is found in the 
2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), particularly in the section dealing with WMD threats.[6] This 
argument was elaborated in two successor documents, the Strategy for Combating Terrorism (SCT) and 
the Strategy to Combat WMD (SCW).[7] These documents, taken together, present the administration's 
rationale for focusing on threats posed by hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of mass 
destruction, for adopting a willingness to undertake preemptive strikes to counter such threats, and for 
developing new offensive nuclear strategies for potential counterproliferation or counterterrorism 
purposes.  
The NSS and successor documents highlight post-9/11 circumstances to urge that the new, emerging 
threats the United States now faces are as grave or graver than those posed by the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War. A crucial assertion fundamental to this claim is that "rogue states," in contrast to the Soviet 
Union, have different motivations, are more determined in pursuing their goals, and are more likely to 
actually use WMD capabilities if they have them. Although the Soviet nuclear threat was much more 
massive, it was a rational state against which deterrence was reliable. For "rogue" states, WMD "are not 
weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice."[8] 
The SCW states clearly that the United States "reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—
including through resort to all our options—to the use of WMD."[9] This notion of using nuclear weapons 
to deter WMD attacks from "rogue" states is not new—Pentagon planners had been giving increasing 
attention to this previously more obscure element of U.S. deterrence policy in the post-Cold War period. 
However, the Bush administration's elevation of this idea to U.S. official policy has significant 
repercussions, not least because the threat of nuclear retaliation against biological, chemical or 
radiological weapons attack directly contravenes U.S. legal commitments under the NPT never to use 
nuclear weapons against a state not armed with nuclear weapons itself. 
The NSS and SCW also underscore that against the "irrational" motivations of "rogue" states, deterrence 
is much more likely to fail. This proposition is highly debatable. The NSS lists a set of attributes of rogue 
states meant to distinguish them from other adversaries the United States has previously faced—"rogues" 
are more risk-taking, uninhibited in using WMD for any purpose, and unconcerned to suffer retaliation or 
even annihilation. But this distinction certainly mischaracterizes past U.S. government views of Soviet 
intentions; indeed, conservative strategists throughout the Cold War routinely portrayed the Soviet Union 
as just as convinced that nuclear war is winnable and just as determined to use nuclear weapons for 
political coercion as current neoconservative strategies now portray "rogue states" to be. The Soviet 
Union was, after all, the "Evil Empire" long before there was an "Axis of Evil."[10]  
The NSS also provides no positive argument why these "rogues" are less easily deterred than was the 
Soviet Union. In fact, Iraq, North Korea and other "rogues" have been quite "rationally" cautious, never 
using WMD capabilities in any context in which retaliation was possible and a deterrent threat applied.[11] 
These states in fact are more easily deterred than was the Soviet Union because they are both 
conventionally and strategically weak; U.S. force capabilities obviously dominate at every level. These 
countries' pursuit of WMD capabilities likely has been motivated not by an irrational desire to attack the 
U.S. despite the consequences, but by the very rational motivation to deter a U.S. attack upon 
themselves.[12]  
A Good Defense is a Strong Offense? 
Exhibiting little faith in deterrence of "rogue" states' WMD ambitions, the NSS and SCW evince even less 
faith in nonproliferation—the conclusion of the SCW's single paragraph on the role of "active 
nonproliferation diplomacy" simply states the need for "a full range of operational capabilities" if the efforts 
fail.[13] Instead, these statements emphasize the need for proactive counterproliferation efforts, including 
preemptive attack, to eliminate adversaries' WMD capabilities before they are used—and even before 
they are explicitly threatened to be used. This emphasis includes the prospect that preempting WMD 
threats may entail use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the incorporation of nuclear roles for countering WMD 
proliferation is one of the key purposes for which the NPR's seamless integration of nuclear-conventional 
strategic planning was devised, and a principal role for which the NPR deems development of smaller 
nuclear weapons for tactical operations to be vital.  
There are several strategic issues raised by this posture. First, it is neither empirically or logically clear 
that threats of preemptive attack to deter an adversary's acquisition of WMD are as inherently credible as 
threats of retaliatory attack to deter an adversary's use of WMD. Second, there are core intractable 
questions concerning the effectiveness and usability of both nuclear and non-nuclear counterproliferation 
weapons, further undermining the acquisition deterrence credibility of counterproliferation threats. Finally, 
there is the prospect that whatever weak acquisition deterrence might accrue from counterproliferation 
threats would be more than offset by U.S. adversaries' increased motivations to obtain capabilities to 
deter U.S. action, fueled by the general undermining of non-nuclear use and nonproliferation norms that 
rededicated U.S. reliance on nuclear threats could foster.[14]  
The Bush administration policies entail not only threatening use of nuclear weapons to deter "rogue state" 
use of WMD, but also possible first use of nuclear weapons to deny WMD capabilities to such states. U.S. 
preemption policy must be logically credible with meaningful criteria to justify its application—and seen to 
be so by the responsible world community as well as the American people. Such legitimacy is vital to 
ensuring that U.S. policy on use of its own nuclear weapons is absolutely distinguishable from its 
characterization of "rogue states," for whom WMD "are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful 
weapons of choice." 
The explanation that the NSS and SCW provide to justify the need for possible preemptive use of force is 
rooted in the nature of WMD capabilities themselves. The NSS acknowledges that international law limits 
the legitimacy of preemption to the existence of an imminent threat. However, the NSS asserts that 
character of WMD threats makes it impossible to wait for traditional criteria for imminence—such as clear 
indications of the time and place of attack—to become manifest. While past international norms 
"conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat," now the United States 
"must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries."[15]  
The generic premise of this argument is correct: international norms on use of military force must adapt to 
fit the times. In fact, historically, the "rules of war" have continually evolved in response to new 
technologies and changed international conditions. However, this evolution has been in the opposite 
direction of the one in which the Bush administration has moved. As emerging nationalism and "total war" 
capabilities qualitatively magnified the dangers of offensive war, international law increasingly 
emphasized the self-defense limitation of legitimate war-making and the imminence of attack limitation of 
legitimate preemption. Many interpret Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, affirming the right of self-
defense "if an armed attack occurs," to forbid preemptive attack of any sort.  
In contrast, the NSS provides no minimum level of imminence, no criteria of imminence comparable 
across differing cases, and no indication of need to forge an international consensus on revising the 
concept of imminence in international law to fit modern threat conditions. It merely states, "The United 
States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor should nations use preemption as a 
pretext for aggression." Most importantly, the Bush administration would allow no restriction on the U.S. 
right to gauge the imminence of a threat for itself; the NSS promises only that the U.S. will "always 
proceed deliberately," "build better, more integrated intelligence," and "coordinate closely with allies."[16]  
The concept of imminence as related to justifying preemption must take into account newly emerging 
WMD threats, but the Bush administration has wielded an axe where a scalpel is needed. The existing 
structure of international norms against the arbitrary use of force widely serves U.S. interests—it enables 
the world community to delineate truly "roguish" behavior and makes it diplomatically easier to constitute 
responsive coalitions of otherwise disparate states.[17] Preemption against WMD threats can and should 
be made to fit within this structure.  
One example of a more nuanced approach is Brad Roberts' explicit consideration of how to build 
generalizable criteria allowing for preemptive attack to thwart proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical 
and radiological weapons.[18] This 1998 work predates the advent of the Bush administration, the 
September 11 attacks, and the political controversy surrounding the administration's preemption policy. 
Roberts offers six criteria whose satisfaction would establish the "strongest moral case" for U.S. 
preemptive action:  
1. Actual threatened use of such weapons specifically against the United States; 
2. Acquisition of such weapons in violation of international law; 
3. Concern for broader U.S. regional security guarantees and/or power stability;  
4. Approval of presidential action by the U.S. Congress;  
5. Backing of the U.N. Security Council and any relevant regional organization; 
6. Satisfaction of the prudential tests of last resort, proportionality, and reasonable chance of 
success. 
These criteria are well tailored to meet the kind of threats central to the concerns of the NSS. They could 
also form the basis of a revision of norms against aggressive use of force that could gain international 
consensus. In contrast, the Bush administration's justification for its policy of preemptive attack as a tool 
for counterproliferation simply disregards existing international norms, incognizant of U.S. interests in 
sustaining those norms. The current U.S. approach, if adopted by all countries, would constitute a 
preemptive "open season" in which states would be restrained in action only by considerations of relative 
power. Motivations for WMD acquisition would be significantly enhanced, and the United States could 
easily find threats to its security propagating faster than its capacity to respond to them.  
Nuclear War on Terrorism? 
As noted earlier, the idea of using U.S. nuclear weapons to deter or counter acquisition or use of WMDs 
against the United States is not new. However, Pentagon planners in the 1990s examining this idea 
worried that non-state terrorist organizations probably could not be deterred by U.S. nuclear forces. The 
September 11 attacks demonstrated that such concern for the undeterrability of terrorist attacks, as 
distinct from state-based WMD attacks, is real.  
Preventing a WMD attack on a global city is rightly a paramount security goal of the international 
community. The unlikelihood of deterrence success against stateless terrorist organizations justifies a 
more proactive policy. Unfortunately, many of the Bush administration's policy statements, including the 
NSS and SCW, obfuscate this core issue by conflating "rogue states and terrorists" into a single threat 
concept.[19] In fact, "rogue states" and "terrorists" are very different entities posing very different types of 
threats to U.S. security. 
"Rogue states" are states, with governments and territories. As discussed above, today's "rogues" have 
shown themselves to be quite deterrable across a range of circumstances. "Terrorists," on the other hand 
are not states; international terrorist organizations are landless entities surviving in the dark alleys of 
globalization. Such organizations well not be deterred by U.S. conventional or nuclear capabilities; 
certainly Al Qaeda is not. But irrationality is not the reason. Deterrence is hard because terrorist 
organizations tend not to have physical assets that can be easily threatened by military force, and 
because they are not motivated (as even "rogue" states are) by survival as a territorially sovereign regime.  
To its credit, the SCT clearly recognizes these key transnational, non-territorial elements of the threat of 
terrorism. The SCT presents a pyramidal "Structure of Terror." "At the base, underlying conditions such 
as poverty, corruption, religious conflict and ethnic strife create opportunities for terrorists to exploit… 
Terrorists use these conditions to justify their actions and expand their support." The next level is the 
"international environment": "As a result of freer, more open borders this environment unwittingly provides 
access to havens, capabilities and other support for terrorists." Only at the third level do we find the role 
of states themselves, which may, "through ignorance, inability, or intent," provide the physical and/or 
virtual havens from which terrorists can work.[20] 
The nature of the global terrorist threat, as described in the SCT, militates against military preemption 
being the first choice policy option. The root cause, underlying conditions, is embedded in the world 
political economy—it cannot be attacked with force of arms, but only through a fulsome campaign to solve 
the trenchant poverty and oppression that are the lifeblood of terrorism's support. To its credit, the SCT's 
third of four goals for counter-terrorism strategy addresses this point.[21] The next level of causation, the 
international environment, is most readily dealt with through intelligence, covert operations and 
collaboration with relevant governments.  
The third level, state governments, is in principle amenable to military influence; but in practice even at 
this level terrorism cannot be easily restrained simply by holding deterrent threats over the governments 
of states within which terrorists reside. For example, a principal state within which the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attacks planned and trained was the U.S. itself. The kind of physical presence that Al 
Qaeda established in Afghanistan under the pliant Taliban regime is rare. In the wake of the U.S. reaction 
to the September 11 attacks, they will be rarer: already Al Qaeda appears have decentralized and hidden 
its operations precisely to avoid exposure to conventional military attack in the future.[22] For their part, 
existing governments with weak territorial sovereignty have every interest to cooperate with U.S. efforts to 
squelch such terrorist usurpation, not simply to avoid U.S. retribution but to enhance their own sovereign 
territorial control. 
Thus, the "war" on terrorism is necessarily more metaphorical than military. As Secretary of State Colin 
Powell noted just days after the September 11 attacks, we are "speaking about war as a way of focusing 
the energy of America and the energy of the international community. . .it may be military action, but it 
can also be economic action, political action, diplomatic action and financial actions. . . it is a long-term 
campaign, which is why we are characterizing it as a war—if not in the technically legal sense of war."[23]  
These fundamental aspects of the problem of global terrorism have gotten lost in the Bush 
administration's increasingly conventional approach to this "new war." The Bush administration's policy 
statements have ceased to recognize the metaphorical nature of terming the anti-terrorism campaign a 
"war", as its military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have become the central features of that campaign.  
Above all, threatening use of nuclear weapons as a means of countering terrorism is likely to do more 
harm than good. Terrorists themselves will not be deterred by such threats, which are more likely to 
exacerbate the challenges of dealing with foundational sources of terrorism the SCT rightly identifies. 
Such threats are irrelevant to weak states unable to control terrorist activities within their borders—
assistance is far more desired.  
Such threats are in principle credible to absolutist states. But due to these states' self-interest in keeping 
control over WMD capabilities whose use could be blamed on them, threats specific to terrorist support 
probably add little to these states' perceptions of the credibility and scope of U.S. deterrence threats. 
Rather, reduced confidence that the U.S. will refrain from nuclear first use will increase tensions in any 
security conflicts in which U.S. nuclear use could be envisioned. 
Moreover, threatening U.S. nuclear weapons use in retaliation for terrorist WMD attack creates a unique 
credibility problem. Supporters of such a position often observe that U.S. leaders should be deprived of 
no response options. However, the logic here is quite different than that of expanding options for 
"escalation dominance" for deterrence purposes. In a context of deterrence failure in which there is no 
risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear war, heavy reliance on a threat of nuclear response can 
create a "commitment trap." After a biological or chemical attack, U.S. leaders might reckon that failure to 
respond with nuclear weapons in that instance would undermine the credibility of threats of nuclear 
response against similar future attacks, thereby making such attacks more likely. This logic "trap" creates 
a temptation for nuclear response regardless of the proximate circumstantial merits of such a response. 
Indeed, Pentagon planners already have reacted to the unlikelihood that nuclear deterrence will work 
against terrorist threats by enhancing preparations to carry out the threatened nuclear attacks.  
Threats All The Way Down? 
A native individual once told a visiting anthropologist that his people believed the entire world rested on 
the back of a turtle. When asked what was under the turtle, the native quickly responded: another turtle. 
When the anthropologist pressed to discover what lay beneath the turtles, the native blithely replied that 
there were "turtles all the way down."[24]  
Underlying the problematic nature of the prominence of nuclear weapons in the Bush administration's 
strategic policies and their application to the war on terrorism is a fundamental qualitative conceptual leap: 
the NPR's implementation of a shift from a "threat-based" to a "capabilities-based" approach to strategic 
planning. This cornerstone of the NPR is also its one genuinely new element, marking a significant 
change from the Cold War era, in which nuclear weapons were developed with specific missions in 
mind—usually deterrence missions.  
The NPR portrays this shift as a response to the replacement of the nuclear threat posed by the former 
Soviet Union by the new prospect of "unexpected developments," and as a means to provide a "credible 
deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons" possible. In fact, however, the shift from a "threat-
based" to a "capabilities-based" approach is a tacit acknowledgement that threats sufficient to justify 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal at planned levels and configurations no longer exist.  
The NSS put this NPR conceptual shift into a broader strategic context, embracing the unprecedented 
fact of unequaled U.S. power and influence, and determining to maintain this position indefinitely in order 
to promote freedom throughout the rest of the world.[25] Such a vision is peculiarly appealing in the 
American political milieu because it harkens to a nineteenth century internationalism underpinned by the 
security of broad oceans, whose principal diplomatic policy was to avoid diplomacy at all. Neither the 
realist nor the idealist traditions in U.S. international policy have embraced diplomatic engagement: the 
former rejected it in favor of pure power (e.g. "speak softly and carry a big stick"), the latter in favor of 
visions of reconstituting international society on ethical terms (e.g. "the war to end all wars"). Diplomacy 
requires patience, acceptance of limits, tolerance, and willingness to compromise—none of which were 
highly prominent traits in the first couple centuries of U.S. international behavior.  
The Cold War shattered the ideal of American unassailability, forcing the U.S. to confront indefinite 
vulnerability by presenting an intractable adversary of equal power who, due to the advent of nuclear 
weapons, could not be met decisively on the battlefield. Neither the realist nor idealist communities were 
ever entirely comfortable with the diplomatic tasks thus thrust upon U.S. policy-makers, epitomized by 
both sides' discomfiture with "mutually assured destruction" as the premise of U.S. security. Reagan's 
vision of missile defense freeing the American people from fear of nuclear attack hearkened powerfully to 
restoration of the vision of unassailability—the "shining city on the hill"[26] is, after all, also a nice strategic 
position.  
The Bush administration strategic posture, at its core, seeks to take advantage of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's preeminent military power to realize 
the Reaganesque vision to restore American unassailability. This vision, articulated by neoconservative 
strategists in and out of the administration, combines the realist and idealist traditions to re-invoke pre-
cold War visions of the American mission to deliver a safer world through virtuous exercise of American 
power: 
[W]e do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of 
power that favors human freedom… We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will 
preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by 
encouraging free and open societies on every continent… The United States welcomes our responsibility 
to lead in this great mission.[27] 
America is a nation with a mission—and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no 
desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the 
dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, 
yet we understand our special calling: This great Republic will lead the cause of freedom.[28]  
Restoring the sense of American unassailability is a prerequisite to carrying forth this vision. But this 
vision, always part myth, is more illusory today than ever before. As the SCT's own "Structure of 
Terrorism" recognizes, the September 11 attacks emerged from an ever more integrating globalization—
the very globalization that U.S. political, economic and social power now leads and from which it draws its 
strength. There is no military protection from globalization's seamy side, and pursuit of such a "Fortress 
America" blinds the most powerful nation on earth to the realities of the twenty-first century world; it offers 
false promise instead of real preparation for the next terrorist attack, and risks distracting attention and 
resources from the practical efforts that might successfully prevent that attack.[29]  
The most basic imperatives of "realpolitik" are for states to prepare to defend themselves from the threats 
they face. These legitimate preparations are already inherently threatening to others—this is the essence 
of the "security dilemma." It is difficult enough to sustain international stability and peace under conditions 
of minimal preparation for war. Military buildups that go beyond meeting clear and present dangers are 
inherently signals to others of more aggressive intentions—this is basic international realism. Such 
behavior by the world's most powerful state, backed by a military budget exceeding that of all other 
nations combined, cannot help but be threatening to other countries—even America's traditionally 
strongest allies have trepidations about current U.S. intentions.[30] Adversaries will respond in kind, to 
the extent that they are able, and new adversaries will emerge. Thus is pursuit of an impossible 
unassailability more likely instead to exacerbate the security threats America already faces.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps.navy.mil with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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